George Kennan and the Inauguration of Political Warfare by Corke, Sarah-Jane
The Journal of Conflict Studies
101
George Kennan and the Inauguration of Political Warfare
by 
Sarah-Jane Corke
Abstract
This article examines the role played by George Frost Kennan in the
development and execution of early American covert operations. The
author argues that Kennan played a crucial role not only in the
development of NSC 10/2: Office of Special Projects but also in the
expansion of these activities during the years 1948 through 1950. In
this case, as in so many others, the corresponding shift in American
Cold War strategy owed more to the personality and belief system of
one man than to changes in the international system.
INTRODUCTION
On 17 March 2005, George Frost Kennan passed away at the age of 101.
During his 27 years of formal public service he served in a number of govern-
ment positions including aid and interpreter to William Bullitt, the first American
Ambassador to Moscow, after the US embassy was reopened in 1933; chargé
d’affaires under Ambassador Averell Harriman from 1944 to 1946, also at the
Moscow embassy; the first deputy for foreign affairs at the National War College
in 1946; and head of Secretary of State George Marshall’s Policy Planning Staff,
from March 1947 to December 1949, where he played an instrumental role in the
creation of the discourse of “containment.” Kennan then went on to serve as the
American Ambassador to the Soviet Union in 1952 and Yugoslavia in 1961. In
addition to his public service, he was the author of 22 books and numerous arti-
cles.1 He also won the Pulitzer Prize in history and in 1989 he was awarded the
Medal of Freedom by President George H.W. Bush. 
Not surprisingly, then, over the years a number of books and articles have
appeared that have highlighted various aspects of his career.2 Despite the array
of sources available, however, Kennan remains to this day somewhat of an enig-
ma: in large part because he was so successful in controlling his public image.3
As a result, significant gaps remain in the historical record.4 For example, very
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little is known about the role he played in the development of early American
covert operations. Aside from a few modest remarks over the years, in which he
tended to downplay his involvement, Kennan has been circumspect in detailing
his part in the development of these operations.5 Scholars have for the most part
followed his lead.6 My objective in this article is to help clarify the role he played
in the development of these activities.7
BACKGROUND
The traditional argument has always been that in December 1947 the
United States initiated limited “psychological warfare operations” as covert
operations were termed at the time under NSC 4-A or “the Report to the National
Security Council by the Executive Secretary of Psychological Operations.” Six
months later, the story goes, because of international events — the Soviet inva-
sion of Czechoslovakia, the war scare of March 1948, and the Berlin Blockade
— the Truman administration decided to increase the scope and pace of these
activities. As a result, in June 1948 the National Security Council passed “NSC
10/2: Office of Special Projects.” Thereafter, we are told, American covert oper-
ations dramatically expanded. In contrast to these arguments, however, I suggest
that external events played only a small role in the release of NSC 10/2.8 Instead,
I believe that the sudden push for a “political warfare capability” — and the sub-
sequent expansion of American covert operations, which took place between
1949 and 1950 — owes more to the personality, perception, and ego of George
Kennan than any other factor. In this case, as in some many others, the evolution
of American Cold War strategy was the result of domestic factors not interna-
tional events.9
Under the National Security Act the CIA was set up to coordinate, evalu-
ate, and disseminate intelligence information. In the summer of 1947, it remained
unclear whether it would conduct “psychological warfare operations,” or covert
operations. As political scientist Amy Zegart correctly pointed out, these types of
activities were never explicitly authorized by the National Security Act.10 And
scholars have long debated what role (if any) they were to have in the postwar
era. Until recently, the “orthodox” argument has always been that when Truman
established the CIA in 1947 he did not intend it to have an operational capabili-
ty. However, despite the president’s apparent ambivalence, there were a number
of high profile government officials who lobbied for the extension of these activ-
ities in the post-war world. Secretary of War James Forrestal first brought the
question up for discussion in mid-1947, when he asked Admiral Roscoe
Hillenkoetter, Director of Central Intelligence, whether operations, such as psy-
chological warfare, sabotage, and support for underground resistance move-
ments, fell under the CIA’s purview as defined by the National Security Act. At
the time Hillenkoetter responded in the negative. In the face of Forrestal’s con-
tinued prodding, however, he turned to the CIA’s legal counsel, Lawrence
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Houston, for guidance.  Houston agreed with Hillenkoetter’s reading of the act
and argued, despite the vague language employed in Section 102 of the CIA’s
charter, black propaganda and other forms of special operations, “would be an
unwarranted extension” of the CIA’s mandate.11 Houston’s legal opinion, which
should have ended speculation, instead opened the issue for debate. The central
question became, if the CIA was not going to claim these activities, under whose
auspices should they be placed? 
International events did force the administration to deal with this question
in late 1947. During the first and second meetings of the National Security
Council (NSC), in November, the crisis in Italy took centre stage.  On the verge
of economic and political collapse Italy was important to the United States only
within the context of rising Soviet-American hostility. Otherwise, due to its polit-
ical, economic, and military weakness, it was considered a “strategic liability.”12
At the time the Christian Democratic Party under Prime Minister Alcide de
Gasperi controlled the Italian government. However, since the end of the Second
World War the Communist Party had been actively exploiting the severe eco-
nomic problems that engulfed the country.13 As a result, it had significantly
gained strength. In 1946, it also united with the Italian Socialist Party to form
“the Peoples Bloc.” By 1947, the Peoples Bloc had over two million members
and controlled 19 percent of the seats in parliament.14 Determined to stem the
flow of communism in Western Europe those present at the first meeting of the
National Security Council explored how best to ensure the election of a “demo-
cratic” Italian government in the elections scheduled for the next year.
Consequently, the first statement of American objectives toward Italy, or “NSC
1/1: The Position of the United States With Respect to Italy,” which was com-
pleted on 14 November 1947, stated that the United States should “actively com-
bat communist propaganda in Italy by an effective information program and by
all other practical means.”15
A plan was quickly drawn up to furnish psychological, political, and mili-
tary aid.16 Although the use of both overt and covert psychological warfare oper-
ations was understood to be a critical part of this plan it remained unclear who
would execute the operations.17 At the second NSC meeting, which took place in
December, it was decided that these operations would be placed under the aus-
pices of the Department of State. State received these activities by default
because no other government department wanted them.18 Over the next month a
psychological warfare paper, initially prepared by the Special Studies and
Evaluation Committee within the State-War-Navy-Coordinating Committee
(SWNCC), was rewritten and presented at the third meeting of the NSC as,
“NSC/4: The Coordination of Foreign Information Measures.”19 The paper stat-
ed that overt information activities should be placed under the Assistant
Secretary for Public Affairs and charged the State Department with overseeing
all psychological operations during times of peace.  However, at this meeting
Secretary of State George Marshall vehemently opposed this plan. It was not that
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he morally disapproved of psychological operations, but rather that he worried
that the State Department’s international credibility would be tarnished if
American operations became public.20 As a result, the job was turned over to the
CIA. At this time the decision was also made to separate information activities
and psychological warfare in much the same manner as had occurred during the
Second World War when President Roosevelt divided these operations between
the Office of War Information (OWI) and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS).
Thus, a secret annex to NSC 4, known today as NSC 4-A, was added. It stated
that while the State Department would oversee “informational activities,” the
CIA would execute “covert psychological operations” or “black” operations.21 In
contrast to open or white operations, black operations consist of any operation
that was not to be attributed to the United States government. 
On 22 December 1947, the same day that NSC 4-A was approved, a spe-
cial operations group from the CIA was sent to Italy under the direction of famed
spymaster James Jesus Angleton, another OSS veteran. Angleton’s primary
responsibility was to transfer American dollars surreptitiously to various front
organizations for use in the upcoming election the following year. All told, the
administration spent somewhere between $10 and 20 million dollars on “anti-
Communist propaganda” and other political operations.22 In March 1948, for
example, the State Department’s radio station, Voice of America, began an exten-
sive propaganda campaign. Celebrities like boxer Rocky Graziano, Eleanor
Roosevelt, Dinah Shore, Frank Sinatra, and Bing Crosby made a series of radio
appeals to the Italian people.23 They stated that if the communists were victori-
ous in the elections not only would Italians be unable to receive economic gifts
from abroad, but also the European Recovery Program could also be terminat-
ed.24 Eventually, the Catholic Church also became involved in the program and
American priests began telling their parishioners to write letters to relatives in
Italy alerting them to the dangers of voting communist in the forthcoming elec-
tions. Although Pope Pius XII originally took an ambivalent position on the elec-
tion — largely because of his suspicion of democracy — he eventually changed
his mind and threatened to impose religious sanctions and refuse absolution to
those who planned to vote communist.25 The movie Ninotchka was also re-
released in the hopes that it too could be used to convince Italians not to vote
communist. Starring Greta Garbo and Melvyn Douglas it satirized life under
communism.26 American psychological warfare operations also extended
beyond propaganda, however, to a number of other activities, including the
bribery of public officials and transfer of funds to political parties. Military aid
and a mass migration campaign were also employed.27
All of these tactics were ultimately successful and on 20 April 1948, the
Christian Democratic Party won the national election by securing 48.5 percent of
the popular vote.28 Although de Gasperi was once again forced to form a coali-
tion government, the perceived success of US operations in Italy produced a
“sense of omnipotence, of confidence that the Free World could successfully
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engage in political warfare against communist subversion.”29 Shortly thereafter
the CIA shifted its attention to the Soviet target. It was at this point that the issue
of who should control these activities once again came to a head. George
Kennan, the new director of George Marshall’s Policy Planning Staff, first began
to voice his concerns about the command and control of these operations the
same month that NSC 4-A was drafted. This was despite the fact that the CIA’s
Special Procedure Group was not officially up and running until three months
later.30
KENNAN AND INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS
Kennan had a long, if somewhat murky, interest in the development of
American intelligence operations. In the summer of 1942, for example, he was
sent to Portugal as Counselor of the Legation. However, his real job, as he told
an audience at the National War College in 1947, was to coordinate American
intelligence activities.31 What he actually did in Portugal and what role he played
in intelligence operations between 1942 and 1946 still remains a mystery.
However, the available evidence suggests that he remained active.32 For exam-
ple, in June 1946, for reasons that still remain unclear, Director of Central
Intelligence, Hoyt S. Vandenberg, appointed him as the “Special Consultant for
Intelligence” for the Central Intelligence Group. Moreover, of the three copies
made of NSC 4-A, one of them went to him: the other two copies went to the
president and to the DCI.
Kennan did not, however, have a great deal of confidence in the
Director of Central Intelligence at the time, Roscoe Hillenkoetter, whom histori-
ans have characterized as a “weak and ineffective,” with “little taste for the
bureaucratic infighting or empire building.”33 The relationship between the two
men came to a head March 1948 when the CIA failed to predict the riots that took
place in Bogotá, Columbia. The ensuing debacle left Secretary of State George
Marshall caught between two warring factions in the streets of Bogotá. Kennan
blamed Hillenkoetter for the fiasco and the relationship between the two men
never recovered.34 However, it was Hillenkoetter’s decision to ignore Kennan’s
advice on the planning of two psychological operations directed at the Soviet
Union in the same month that ultimately led to Kennan’s determination to con-
trol covert operations. 
The story begins on 22 December 1947, just after the release of NSC 4-A,
when Hillenkoetter instructed Thomas C. Cassidy, an ex-banker from Chicago
and one of William Donovan’s most trusted aides, to organize a foreign infor-
mation branch with the Office of Special Operations (OSO). This group was sub-
sequently renamed the Special Procedures Group (SPG) and Col. Donald H.
Galloway, another holdover from the Office of Strategic Services, was made the
Assistant Director for Special Operations. Although, the SPG came into exis-
tence on 1 January 1948 it was not until two months later that it was ready to
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undertake operations. However, as Galloway and Cassidy set out to develop psy-
chological warfare operations they found there was no statement of objectives,
or corresponding strategy available to guide their planning. Although James
Forrestal had been lobbying for a clear, concise report on which operational plan-
ning could be based since early 1947, no such guidance was available.35
Forrestal was not alone. A number of government offices, including the
Central Intelligence Group, deluged the State Department with requests for guid-
ance.36 Although their desire for instructions was continually rebuffed, in May
1947, General Dwight Eisenhower formed a little-known organization to study
concepts of security in light of the atomic age. This group also brought pressure
to bear on the State Department. It appears that those working on the project
found it extremely difficult to develop military strategy without a clear idea of
what American objectives were in the Cold War. As a result, in February 1948,
three colonels from Eisenhower’s Advanced Study Group (ASG) met with rep-
resentatives of the Policy Planning Staff (S/P) and requested a report that out-
lined US objectives.  When Kennan refused to undertake the project — appar-
ently he hated writing these papers because they “demanded an elucidation of
imponderables that defy close analysis”37 — Forrestal interceded and the job
subsequently was given to the NSC senior staff. One month later the report was
completed. It did not, however, have the State Department’s support.
“NSC 7: The Position of the United States With Respect to Soviet Domi-
nated World Communism,”38 became the American government’s first official
statement on the Soviet Union. Its central conclusion was that, “a defensive pol-
icy cannot be considered an effective means of checking the momentum of
Soviet expansion.” Asserting that the “defeat” of communism was “vital to the
security of the United States,” the authors argued that the administration should
take the lead in organizing a world-wide “counter-offensive” aimed at strength-
ening anti-communist forces in the West and at undermining the strength of the
communist forces in the East.39 In line with these objectives, NSC 7 suggested
that the United States should intensify its fledgling anti-communist information
campaign and  “develop and at the appropriate time carry out, a coordinated pro-
gram to support underground resistance movements in countries behind the iron
curtain, including the USSR.”40
Not surprisingly, given the myth of containment that was developing in the
aftermath of the release of Kennan’s infamous article the previous summer, a
number of people within the State Department were unhappy with the strategy
set forth in NSC 7. Kennan argued at the time that it represented a significant
break with previous American policy on two points.41 First, he argued, it illus-
trated the acceptance of a strategy designed to undermine Soviet power and
influence in both Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union through covert means.
Second, he stated, it provided a new program to establish underground resistance
movements behind the Iron Curtain. The offices of the American Republic,
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European Affairs, Near Eastern Affairs, and United Nations Affairs, voiced their
concerns as well. And the Joint Chiefs of Staff also raised a number of com-
plaints.42 However, no one disagreed with the shift to the new “counter-offensive
strategy” outlined. Rather they believed that the conclusions set forth in the paper
were too general to be of any use.43
Because of the controversy that developed Kennan decided to place the
report in “indefinite abeyance” until he and Marshall had had a chance to ham-
mer out “some of the problems implicit in its conclusions.”44 However, given the
numerous requests for policy guidance that continued to inundate the staff it was
subsequently decided that the report should be forwarded to the NSC as “an ini-
tial paper” and that it would be followed up by specific guidelines at a later date.
However, the follow-up never occurred. Thus, as drafted, NSC 7 outlined a new,
albeit undefined, “counter-offensive” strategy for waging cold war on the Soviet
Union. This strategy was, of course, significantly different from the “strategic
vision” outlined by Kennan in July 1947.45 Not surprisingly, there was a great
deal of confusion within the administration about what US policy actually was.
Although NSC 7 suggested that something could be done to combat Soviet hege-
mony in Eastern Europe through the use of psychological warfare operations and
resistance groups, it left open the question of just what these tactics were
designed to achieve. It also failed to address the issue of US capabilities — or
more to the point the lack thereof — behind the Iron Curtain. 
Under pressure from the military to get things going, however, Cassidy and
Galloway immediately began to plan operations designed to “encourage the free-
dom-loving elements in those countries that have been over-run by
Communism.”46 The first campaign they put together was code named PRO-
JECT UMPIRE. Its goal was to beam propaganda into the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe by way of a transmitter strategically placed in West Germany.
One month later, they proposed a second operation, code named PROJECT
ULTIMATE, which would drop propaganda leaflets behind the Iron Curtain
using weather balloons. Under Secretary of State Robert Lovett initially gave his
approval for both operations.47
Less than a week after Cassidy and Galloway had received Lovett’s go-
ahead, however, the Policy Planning Staff withdrew State’s support, telling
Cassidy that the “time was not ripe” for a campaign designed to use such “incen-
diary” propaganda.48 It was Kennan who ordered the operations cancelled. At the
time he stated that the operations about to be undertaken were too “aggressive.”
He also asked SPG to explain who would be operating the radios used in PRO-
JECT ULTIMATE and what was going to be said.49 Legitimate questions cer-
tainly, but they were classified as operational details and Cassidy had always
maintained that he did not have to discuss operational details with the State
Department. In the face of Kennan’s veto Cassidy turned to Galloway and
Hillenkoetter for advice on how to resolve the situation. He pointed out that the
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pamphlets he planned to use in PROJECT ULTIMATE were in no way as incen-
diary as those being currently employed in the Italian campaign.50 After review-
ing the entire situation Hillenkoetter told Cassidy to ignore Kennan and go ahead
with the operations, which were scheduled to begin in April 1948.51 The DCI
based his decision to defy Kennan on his understanding that, although under
NSC 4-A he was required to “consult,” with the State Department, he was not
required to “defer” to them.52 Armed with the DCI’s approval Cassidy continued
to develop operations in line with the objectives outlined in NSC 7.53
What happened next is of critical importance to understanding the evolu-
tion of American covert operations in the Cold War. Less than a month after
Hillenkoetter told Cassidy to go ahead with the operations a proposal for a new
agency that would conduct covert operations appeared. On 3 May 1948, a paper
titled “The Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare,” was circulated within
the National Security Council. The available evidence suggests that Kennan not
only had an active role in its drafting but actually spearheaded the project.
Indeed, according to Arthur Darling, the first in-house historian of the CIA, the
paper was, “vintage Kennan.”54 However, that said, John Paton Davies, one of
Kennan’s subordinates on the Policy Planning Staff, probably wrote the initial
draft of the paper.55 Irrespective of who actually wrote the “The Inauguration of
Political Warfare,” Kennan’s fingerprints were all over it. This was true of the
majority of Policy Planning Staff papers released during this period. Not only did
Kennan compose the majority of these papers but he also rarely allowed a paper
to be released without his explicit approval. Moreover, although all papers ema-
nating from the Policy Planning Staff were supposed to include dissenting views
if they existed within the department, they rarely did so.56 Kennan ruled his staff
with an iron fist.
In “The Inauguration of Political Warfare” paper the author stated that a
new, independent organization to plan and conduct “political warfare” should be
set up and defined the term “political warfare” as “the employment of all the
means at a nation’s command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives.”
He went on to note that these operations should be both overt and covert, and
include political alliances, economic policies, and the encouragement of under-
ground resistance organizations.57 Under the plan four operations were outlined.
The first operation listed was the development of “Liberation Committees”
across Europe. They were defined as organizations designed to act as foci of
national hope and revive a sense of purpose among political refugees from the
Soviet world; provide inspiration for continuing popular resistance within the
countries of the Soviet world; and serve as a potential nucleus for all-out libera-
tion movements in the event of war.58
The report also proposed supporting “indigenous Anti-Communist ele-
ments in the threatened countries of the free world” and undertaking “preventa-
tive direct action in Free Countries.”59 It also advocated the use of “direct
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action,” a euphemism for covert operations employed at the time to protect crit-
ical American infrastructure. The paper also called for the destruction of similar
infrastructure programs critical to the Soviets.60 The last operation listed sug-
gested that paramilitary operations, guerrilla units, sabotage forces, subversive
operations, and rebellions be used to subvert the Soviet bloc.61 To conduct these
operations the author suggested that a new organization should be set up under a
new Director of Special Studies who would be nominated by the Department of
State and appointed by the NSC. However, while the report stated that the direc-
tor would be responsible to the State Department the authors made it clear that
he should not be formally associated with it.62
Here is where the story gets interesting. In the report all of the operations
outlined were defined as “political warfare operations” instead of “psychological
warfare operations” or psychological operations, which had been the norm until
this time. Indeed, this was the first time the word “political warfare” appeared in
any post-war discussion of American operational planning. In fact, during the
Second World War, American officers dismissed the term “political warfare”
because it was seen as “too British.”63 Yet, in May 1948, the decision was made
to replace the term “psychological operations” with “political warfare;” the ques-
tion is, of course, why? In her official history of the Central Intelligence Agency
completed for the Church Committee, Anne Karalekas tells us that the shift from
psychological operations under NSC 4-A to political warfare under NSC 10/2
was significant because the “latter meant the direct intervention in the electoral
process of sovereign governments, rather than attempts to influence public opin-
ion activities through the media.”64 Until recently, this distinction was the accept-
ed norm. The traditional argument has always been that the United States only
began to conduct political warfare in June of 1948, after the passage of NSC
10/2. Yet, American intervention in the Italian elections and French labor dis-
putes were well underway by the time NSC 10/2 appeared. By definition these
operations were political interventions, not psychological operations.65 Thus,
Karalekas’s distinction would seem to be erroneous. And indeed it was. Instead,
the sudden push to adopt NSC 10/2 must be understood within the context of
Kennan’s determination to control covert operations and remove these activities
from DCI Hillenkoetter’s control. CIA in-house historian Arthur Darling made
this point explicitly when he argued that, for all practical purposes, the phrases
“psychological warfare” and “political warfare” were “interchangeable. It better
suited [Kennan’s] argument to use ‘political’ rather than ‘psychological’
[because] political matters are by tradition that particular concern of the
Department of State.”66
At this point the reader may be wondering why, given the ongoing Soviet
blockade of Berlin (June 1948-May 1949), which began almost a week after the
passage of NSC 10/2, would Kennan advocate the use of covert operations to
undermine Soviet power. After all, in the spring and summer of 1948 many
Americans believed they were on the verge of World War Three. Yet, neither
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Kennan nor the majority of those in the State Department believed that the
Soviets would go to war against the United States. In terms of the crisis in Berlin
the only danger, according to Kennan, was a miscalculation. Understanding
Kennan’s philosophy on the nature and degree of the Soviet threat is crucial to
comprehending why he took a leading role in the development of these opera-
tions. Had he believed that war was probable he never would have advocated
these campaigns.67
Kennan received additional help to have these operations removed from
Hillenkoetter’s control from the Dulles Survey Group. In February 1948, Truman
had appointed three men to look at the performance of the CIA as a whole. The
group was set up because neither Secretary of Defense Forrestal nor Sidney
Souers, Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, had the time to
supervise the CIA’s operations. As a result, the president decided to assemble a
group of outside consultants who would “check up” on the agency from time to
time.68 It was hoped that this procedure would prevent many of the problems that
had developed during the Second World War.  Set up under the direction of Allen
Dulles, the other members of the Survey Group included William H. Jackson and
Mathias F. Correa. The point man in the group, however, was Dulles. Kennan and
Dulles were good friends. They frequented the same social gatherings and had
met a number of times in the recent past to discuss how covert operations might
be employed in the Cold War. Thus, it should come as no surprise that the Survey
Group was strongly prejudiced against Hillenkoetter from the start.
Although an investigation of covert operations was not within the mandate
of the group, given the controversy that was brewing over the control of these
operations, coupled with Dulles’ wartime experience in the area and his friend-
ship with Kennan, the “Survey Group” offered to include a small section on
operations. And in an auspices sign of things to come, they submitted the report
on these activities one day after offering to do so. Today, the timing remains
somewhat questionable, especially when put in the context of Kennan’s behind-
the-scene machinations. In the report Dulles argued that American covert opera-
tions in the Cold War should be expanded. However, he pointed out that a cen-
tral planning and coordination staff was essential. He added that it would be
extremely dangerous for American interests to have several uncoordinated oper-
ations going on behind the Iron Curtain. 
To prevent the numerous problems he envisioned Dulles strongly recom-
mended that the Director of Central Intelligence have intimate knowledge of all
operational details.  But he went on to note that, given Hillenkoetter’s weak and
ineffective leadership, he did not feel this particular DCI was up to the task at
hand. Thus, he concluded that in the present circumstances American interests
would be better served by placing all political warfare operations in a new organ-
ization.69 Dulles’ conclusions virtually echoed Kennan’s recommendations,
which reached the National Security Council less than a week later.  
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On 19 May 1948, Kennan wrote a memo to Robert Lovett and George
Marshall in which he argued that, although all political operations should be
housed within the CIA, with “respect to both personalities and organization” this
was not the favored solution at the present time. Instead, he recommended that
they “let the CIA sleeping dog lie” and an independent organization be set up,
which could at “a later date could be incorporated into CIA.”70 He even went so
far as to suggest that if the changes he wanted were not adopted it would be bet-
ter for the United States to give up conducting such operations completely rather
than leave them as they were.71
Both reports were discussed in detail during the 11th meeting of the
National Security Council, which took place on 20 May 1948.72 Although
Kennan did not personally attend this meeting, given the controversy that was
brewing all covert operations within the SPG were put on hold.73 However,
Hillenkoetter for his part did not take Kennan’s interference lying down.74 And
he too resorted to the name game in order to strengthen his, and by default the
CIA’s, position. In all of his replies to Kennan’s proposal he consistently substi-
tuted the term “psychological” for “political” warfare.75 Secondly, although he
had initially lobbied against the CIA controlling these operations he now argued
that it would be foolhardy to set up another independent group that would only
duplicate the operations already being planned.76 As he noted, quite correctly it
appears in retrospect, Kennan’s plan would “establish a staff function providing
for AUTHORITY in a delicate field of operations — without the RESPONSI-
BILITY.”77 As time went on Hillenkoetter’s concerns continued to mount. On 8
June 1948, he wrote to James Lay saying, “since State evidently will not go along
with CIA operating this political warfare thing in any sane or sound manner, we
should go back to the original concept . . . let State run it and let it have no con-
nection with us at all.”78 The bureaucratic conflict was taking a toll on the DCI.
Yet, Kennan was not initially successful in having these operations
removed from under Hillenkoetter’s control as the final draft, NSC 10/2: Office
of Special Projects, called for a new office to be set up under the DCI’s auspices.
However, an important caveat was added, which stated that the “Director of
Special Projects” was to be nominated by the Department of State. While
Kennan was not satisfied with this option in the long-term, he was forced to com-
promise in the short-term, because an agreement had to be reached quickly in
order to secure additional funds before Congress adjourned for the summer.79
Given the closing window of opportunity, on 18 June, he formally withdrew his
opposition to the new NSC paper. He told Lovett and Marshall that he might as
well agree to the new proposal because, as he put it, “it was probably the best
arrangement” they could get at this time.80
In order to solidify the agreement and make it more palatable to Kennan,
Forrestal and Lovett came up with an additional compromise. Although there
would be no new agency and the CIA would continue to conduct covert opera-
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tions, both Cassidy and Galloway were replaced. Since they had been the worst
offenders their removal would be considered a face-saving gesture for Kennan.
Everyone agreed and the new Chief of Plans position was offered, on Kennan’s
recommendation, to Allen Dulles. Unwilling to serve in the number two slot
below Hillenkoetter, however, Dulles declined the offer. It was subsequently
given to Frank Wisner whom Dulles had recommended. Wisner came over to the
CIA from his position as Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas.  At the
time he was thought to be “State’s Man” and many believed that the SPG’s “free
wheeling” days were over. They were wrong.
Wisner replaced Cassidy in August 1948. The SPG was abolished and the
Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) was set up in its place. NSC 4-A was can-
celled and NSC 10/2 instructed Wisner to conduct propaganda, economic war-
fare, preventative direct action, and subversion. Included under the heading of
subversion was assistance to guerrilla and refugee liberation groups.81 However,
NSC 10/2 also clearly stated that the DCI should oversee the development of
these operations. Although the situation appeared to be resolved, the story did not
end here because Kennan remained committed to having covert operations
removed from under Hillenkoetter’s command. As a result he viewed NSC 10/2
as a flawed document and not surprisingly he continued his campaign to remove
Hillenkoetter from the operational process.
In August 1948, two months after NSC 10/2 was signed, Kennan called a
meeting in order to “clarify” the lines of authority under NSC 10/2. Assembled
at the August meeting were Kennan, Hillenkoetter, Wisner, Sidney Souers,
Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, Col. Yeaton (representing
the military), and Robert Blum from the Policy Planning Staff.  Despite the meet-
ing’s informality, a “memorandum of the conversation” was taken and each par-
ticipant was asked to sign it as they departed.82 It could not have been a pleasant
experience for the DCI given the animosity between him and the director of the
Policy Planning Staff; and it is quite clear from reading the minutes that Kennan
and Wisner had him ambushed from the start. 
Kennan began the discussion by telling Hillenkoetter that he wanted “spe-
cific knowledge not only of the objectives of every operation, but of the proce-
dures and methods involving political decisions.” Kennan then made it clear that
he alone would decide which projects were “politically desirable.” Hillenkoetter
agreed, but added that under these new restrictions the State Department must be
willing to accept “political responsibility” for all operations and provide addi-
tional guidance, as needed, throughout each project’s duration. Hillenkoetter
stated that this had not been the case in the past and as a rule operations had been
turned over to him by State without the required political guidance. Kennan
assured him that this would no longer occur and he would be “personally
accountable.”83
Frank Wisner then took the floor. Apparently he did not think much of
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Hillenkoetter either, whom he later characterized as an “amiable lightweight.”
Like Kennan, Wisner directed his comments to the DCI telling him that, given
the nature of his work, it was of the utmost importance that he, Wisner, had direct
access to both the State and Defense Departments without having to pass through
the CIA’s administrative hierarchy. Hillenkoetter again agreed with the proviso
that he be kept informed of all “important” decisions.84 And herein lay the rub;
the agreement reached at the meeting ensured that the DCI would be removed
from the policy loop on all decisions not deemed by Wisner to be important.
According to Michael Warner, another CIA in-house historian, this procedure
gave the OPC a substantial amount of latitude within which to work and had the
unintended consequence of making it “a quasi independent entity.”85 Between
August of 1948 and June of 1950, when Walter Bedell Smith, finally replaced
Hillenkoetter and brought OPC firmly under his command, Frank Wisner and his
men were able to function as an independent operating unit. OPC’s independence
“went so far that OPC’s intelligence requests were handled by the CIA as
requests for a separate agency.”86
CONCLUSION
Although a number of mechanisms were subsequently put in place to pro-
vide strategic guidance to the OPC, they were unsuccessful. For example, on 14
June 1948, Kennan set up what became known as the 10/2 Panel. It consisted of
two representatives: one from State, George Kennan, and one from the military,
Joseph McNarney. Their job was to provide policy guidance to the Office of
Policy Coordination. After the meeting in August, Kennan also assigned Robert
Joyce and John Davies, two members of the Policy Planning Staff, to act as a liai-
son between his office and that of the Director of Plans in order to ensure that
guidance was in fact given. However, throughout this period there was “no for-
mal mechanism whereby individual projects” were discussed or approved.87
Although Wisner met with Kennan once a week, their discussions were “very
general and allowed for the maximum opportunity for project development.”88
Given that Kennan was “the prime mover” in the establishment of OPC, it was
unlikely that he “discouraged the overall direction of an organization he helped
to build.” The same can be said for the military representative on the 10/2 Panel
who was “very sympathetic” to OPC concerns.89 As one observer later lament-
ed, the meetings between Kennan, McNarney, and Wisner often “degenerated
into a sort of stereotyped chore for all concerned.”90 And in the end the 10/2
Panel “failed to provide a continuing element of review and evaluation” for
covert operations during the early years of the Cold War.91 The lack of guidance
was made worse by the operational culture that developed within OPC. Although
Kennan believed that Wisner would serve him faithfully, the new director of
plans “quickly developed an institutional loyalty to OPC and its mission.”92
Infused by William Donovan’s spirit, Wisner went on to run OPC as an inde-
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pendent body. As one CIA deputy inspector later recalled, Frank Wisner and his
staff “arrogated themselves total power, with no inhibiting precedent. They could
do what they wanted, just as long as the “higher authority,” as we called the pres-
ident, did not expressly forbid it . . .. They had a heaven sent obligation and God
knows, what opportunity.”93 In the words of intelligence aficionado, Tom
Braden, OPC was able to “run wild.”94 In the end Kennan co-opted the process
and indirectly contributed to the dramatic growth in American covert operations
that took place in 1949 and 1950. Although a number of senior government offi-
cials, including those involved in the Dulles Survey Group, made it clear that
unless the DCI was kept in the operational loop problems would develop,
Kennan allowed his personal feelings for Hillenkoetter to overshadow their
words of caution. Moreover, although he had accepted responsibility for ensur-
ing that US covert operations were in line with American foreign policy, in
August 1948, he failed to do his job.  It is no surprise then, that Kennan did all
he could to ensure that this episode remained one of the least discussed in
American Cold War history.
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